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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1937-19381
PERSONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

T

HE Illinois law of municipal corporations has enjoyed its
usual activity during the year. The oil "boom" within the
state,2 the pressing needs of air traffic,' and the continued availability of "easy" Federal money for public works4 have elicited
legislative response. The courts, too, have produced their customarily abundant crop of decisions, many of which are merely
cumulative with respect to matters well settled, but some few of
which may be regarded as significant.'
1 The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon or annotation of the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year but is published rather for the purpose merely of calling attention to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is
that of the judicial year, i.e., October to October, embracing from 366 Ill. 552
to 369 Ill. 231; from 291 Ill. App. 508 to 296 Ill. App. 540; and from 92 F. (2d) 1 to
98 F. (2d) 832.
2 The powers of cities and villages were enlarged by the addition of a new
section of the Cities and Villages Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1938 supp., Ch. 24, § 65.62a,
H.B. No. 69, §1), which authorizes the city council in cities and the village board
in villages to grant' permits authorizing the mining of oil and gas within the
municipal limits.
3 An amendment to an existing section of the Cities and Villages Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1938 supp., Chi. 24, § 65.99%, S.B. No. 4, §1) enlarges the powers of municipalities with reference to the establishment and maintenance of airports by
granting specifically the power to acquire land and rights of way, by purchase,
condemnation, agreement, lease, or otherwise, and to enter into contracts for
the removal of obstructions interfering with the improvement of such airports.
The impasse which had confronted the city of Chicago in this respect was rather
obviously within the legislative contemplation.
4 The bonding powers of cities having a population under 500,000 was increased
from 2 to 5 per cent in the case of bonds issued for the purpose of acquiring
or constructing a city hall or municipal building (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1938 supp., Ch.
24, § 662.15, H. B. No. 59, §1). A similar increase was provided for in the event
of indebtedness incurred for the purpose of constructing, altering, improving, or
repairing of streets, sidewalks, or alleys (Ch. 113, § 44.12, H.B. No. 13, §1); for
the purpose of acquiring rights-of-way and borrow pits for the construction of
levees (Ch. 113, § 44.13, H.B. No. 16, § 1); and for the purpose of constructing,
purchasing or acquiring city halls, police or fire department buildings (Ch. 113,
§ 44.14, H.B. No. 54, §1). These provisions were doubtless prompted by the fact
that many cities had reached the limit of their debt-incurring power, and were
therefore prevented from undertaking the construction of useful and needed
works and from securing grants, or loans and grants, from the Federal Emergency
Administration of Public Works.
5 Two cases dealing with tort liability of municipalities are noted below under
the heading "Torts."
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Zoning
In two decisions the Supreme Court has charted further the
zoning law of the state. In Speroni v. Board of Appeals,6 the
court approved a zoning ordinance dividing a city into industrial,
commercial, and residential districts, and excluding apartment
houses from the residential district. In an earlier case 7 the court
upheld an ordinance excluding apartment houses from a strip of
lake front property zoned for residential use. In that case, however, it did not appear that apartment houses were excluded
from all other residential districts as well. In the instant case,
apartment houses could only be constructed in industrial or commercial districts. The court emphasized the fact, however, that
there were substantial residential areas in the commercial and
industrial districts, and that apartment houses could not be restricted to districts "unfit for human habitation." In the other
case, that of Decatur Park District v. Becker,8 the court, without
citing any authority, decided that a city could not exclude parks
from class A residential districts. No such power of exclusion
was given by the legislature, the court said, and the recognition
of such a power would result in a holding that parks could only be
established in commercial and industrial zones.
Board Meetings
In the case of People v. New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company,' the Supreme Court considered, apparently for
the first time, the legality of a meeting of a county board of
supervisors not called in accordance with statutory requirements. The board had adjourned from the regular meeting in
September, "subject to the call of the chairman." On November
26, the chairman called a special meeting, a notice of which was
published and also mailed to each member of the board. The
court held that the adjournment in September was in effect sine
die, and that the meeting of November 26 was not an adjourned
regular meeting nor a legal special meeting. 10 The court ruled,
6 368 III. 568, 15 N.E. (2d) 302 (1938).
7

Minkus v. Pond, 326 Il. 467, 158 N.E. 121 (1927).

8 368 Il. 442, 14 N.E. (2d) 490 (1938).

536, 15 N.E. (2d) 297 (1938).
9 368 Ill.
Rev. Stat 1937, Ch. 34, § 51: "Special meetings of the board of supervisors
10 Ill.
shall be held only when requested by at least one-third of the members of the
board, which request shall be in writing, addressed to the clerk of the board, and
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accordingly, that tax levies made at this attempted meeting were
void. The practice which prevails of adjourning from time to
time regular county board meetings to avoid the expense and
time involved in calling special meetings, may lead to the disastrous result reached here unless the meetings are adjourned
to a fixed date to be reconvened automatically.
Estoppel
Two cases in the Appellate Court concerning the doctrine of estoppel of municipal corporations are perhaps worthy of mention.
In Cook v. City of Staunton,"' the court held that the rule distinguishing between municipal contracts which are ultra vires in
the strict sense and contracts which are within the power of the
corporation but irregularly or illegally made, and allowing a recovery in the latter class of cases, was applicable to special assessment bonds to which the following three defenses were
interposed: (1) that the bonds did not mature during the year
for which the respective installments became due and payable as
required by statute, (2) that some of the bonds were issued
against the first installment when they should only be issued
against the second and succeeding installments, and (3) that the
aggregate amount of the bonds was in excess of the assessment
as confirmed. Following the general rule of estoppel as laid
2 the court held the city
down in McGovern v. City of Chicago,"
liable. To be contrasted with this decision is the case of Folkers
v. Butzer,5 in which the court, reaffirming a rule established in
earlier cases,1" held that a statutory requirement calling for
competitive bids in the letting of road construction contracts was
mandatory, and that a failure to follow the prescribed procedure
was not a mere irregularity which the town, having received the
benefits, was estopped to rely upon as a defense, but an omission
which rendered the entire contract illegal and void.
specifying the time and place of such meeting, upon reception of which the clerk
shall immediately transmit notice, in writing, of such meeting, to each of the
members of the board. The clerk shall also cause notice of such meeting to be
published in some newspaper printed in the county, if any there be."
11 295 Ill. App. 111, 14 N.E. (2d) 696 (1938).
13 294 Ill. App. 1, 13 N. E. (2d) 624 (1938).
264, 118 N.E. 3 (1917).
12 281 Ill.
14 Brownell Improvement Co. v. Highway Commissioner, 280 Ill. App. 43 (1935);
Challacombe v. Commissioner of Highways, 161 Ill. App. 115 (1911): Dement v.
Rokker, 126 IM. 174, 19 N.E. 33 (1888).
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Control of Property
A lease by a county board of supervisors of space in a courthouse to a private abstracter was held to be unauthorized in
Yakley v. Johnson.5 The court ruled that the statutory power16
of the board to sell, convey, or lease real estate and to rent space
not needed for county purposes to any "city, village, town, sanitary district, or other municipal corporation" did not authorize
a lease for a private purpose. In an early case,' 7 the court held
that the county could recover possession by forcible entry and
detainer of space granted by a county recorder to a private abstracting firm.'" In that case, however, the action was ordered
brought by the board of supervisors itself, so that the problem of
the instant case was not involved. Another case dealing in a
sense with the use and control of municipal property is that of
People v. Village of Lakewood, 9 in which the Supreme Court considered the extent to which a village may exercise control over
the territory included within a township park. The court ruled
that such township parks may exist within a village and are subject to the police control of the village for the maintenance of order, but that in other matters, including the granting of licenses
for concessions, the jurisdiction of the board of park commissioners is exclusive. No cases were cited and the case is believed to
be one of first impression.
Eminent Domain
In People v. City of Chicago,20 a mandamus action to compel
the city to pay a condemnation judgment, the Supreme Court
held that the city could not offset against the claim for interest
the value of the beneficial use of the property by the judgment
creditor who was allowed to remain in possession, inasmuch as
this would, in effect, amount to enforcing a tenancy on the creditor with rental equivalent to interest accruing on the judgment.
The court pointed out that the tenant's possession was subject to
termination by the city at any time and its action in permitting
the creditor, to remain on the property was purely voluntary.
15 295 II. App. 77, 14 N.E. (2d) 692 (1938).
16 I. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 34, §§ 24, 25, and 163.
17 Hardin v. County of Sangamon, 71 Ill. App. 103 (1896).
18 The court there held that the care and custody of the court house were
vested in the board of supervisors and the sheriff, and that the recorder's possession was only coextensive with his official duties.
20 368 II. 421, 14 N.E. (2d) 473 (1938).
19 368 IlM.209, 13 N.E. (2d) 275 (1938).
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The decisions relied upon to support the decision were drawn
from other jurisdictions.
Licenses
The city of Chicago suffered another adverse decision in the
Supreme Court in Bullman v. City of Chicago, 2 in which it was
determined that dealers in used cars and accessories are not subject to the licensing power of the city. The provision of the Cities
and Villages Act22 authorizing cities to "tax, license, regulate...
dealers in junk, rags and any second-hand article whatsoever.
... " was construed to authorize the regulation and licensing of
only such businesses as were similar to junk shops, the more
general term "any second-hand article whatsoever" being limited
by the particular words preceding. In several earlier decisions the
court had held that the licensing and regulatory powers of cities
under this and similar provisions did not extend to wholesale
dealers in scrap iron and steel,2" dealers in second-hand bottles,24
dealers in second-hand books,2 5 or to wholesale dealers in rags. 26
CORPORATIONS

The opinion of the Appellate Court in Neiman v. Templeton,
Kenly & Company, Ltd." explores rather thoroughly and clarifies expressions concerning the statutory qualifications and limitations on the right of a stockholder to examine the books of a corporation. Section 45 of the Business Corporation Act 2" was ruled
to be reasonable and constitutional and applicable to the plaintiff
who had filed a petition for mandamus allegedly based upon the
section. The petitioner contended that the qualifications therein
prescribed 29 were applicable only where the penalty was sought
for failure to allow examination and that the concluding paragraph" of the section preserved the common law right of mandaIll. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 24, § 65.94.
330, 197 N.E. 893 (1935).
24 City of Chicago v. Reinschreiber, 121 Ill. App. 114 (1905).
25 Eastman v. City of Chicago, 79 Ill. 178 (1875); City of Chicago v. Moore,
351 Ill. 510, 184 N.E. 621 (1933).
26 City of Chicago v. Northern Paper Co., 337 Ill. 194, 168 N.E. 884 (1929).
27 294 IM. App. 45, 13 N.E. (2d) 290 (1938). Notes, 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684; 32
M. L. Rev. 988.
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 32, J 157.45.
29 ". . . a shareholder of record for at least six months immediately preceding
his demand or who shall be the holder of record of at least five per cent of all
the outstanding shares of a corporation.. .. "
30 "Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of competent
jurisdiction, upon proof by a shareholder of proper purpose, to compel by manda21

367 Ill. 217, 10 N.E. (2d) 961 (1938).

22

23 City of Chicago v. Iroquois Iron Co., 361 I.
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mus to any stockholder who could show a proper purpose. The
court said that this paragraph has reference only to the purpose
for which the examination is sought and to the remedy, and not
to the qualifications of the shareholder. Another case of interest
is that of Spivey v. Spivey Building Corporation,"'holding that a
building corporation incorporated in Delaware for the sole purpose of acquiring, owning, and operating a building in Illinois,
had a valid existence in Illinois and could acquire title to property in the latter state. Thus had been consummated a radical
change in the policy of the state toward corporate ownership of
land. 2
FAMILY

In Dwyer v. Dwyer,"s a case of first impression, the Illinois Supreme Court held that adoption does not relieve the natural parents of the duty to support a child. In that case the child had been
adopted by third persons and subsequently readopted by its
mother, who was the divorced wife of the defendant parent. Another case, apparently of first impression, involving the family,
is that of Thoresen v. Thoresen, 4 in which attorneys for a divorced wife sought to enforce against defendant divorced husband
an attorney's lien on money payable under a decree in the form
of alimony. The Appellate Court held the statute relating to attorney's lien 5 inapplicable to a divorce proceeding, saying:
The inherent nature of a divorce proceeding wherein a wife, if she prevails, may be awarded as an incident to her decree of divorce not damages
but an allowance for her support and wherein the only allowance for
attorney's fees provided for or contemplated by the Divorce Act is to the
wife, precludes the applicability of the Attorney's Lien Act to such proceeding.36
PROPERTY
WILLS
3

7

In Swirski v. Darlington apparently the first decision construing the amendment of 1925 adding "forgery" to Section 2 of the
mus or otherwise the production for examination by such shareholder of the books
and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders of a corporation."
31 367 Ill. 25, 10 N.E. (2d) 385 (1937). Note, 16 CmcAco-KENT REvIEw 55.
32 See Carroll v. City of East St. Louis, 67 Ill.
568 (1873), holding a foreign
corporation incapable of holding title to Illinois realty.
33 366 IR. 630, 10 N.E. (2d) 344 (1937). Notes, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 199; 26
Ill. B. J. 211; 32 Ill. L. Rev. 477; 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1028.
34 293 Ill.
App. 168, 12 N.E. (2d) 28 (1937).
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 13, §14.
36 P. 175
37 369 Ill.
188, 15 N.E. (2d) 856 (1938).
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Wills Act,8" the court held that proof of forgery of a will offered
for probate may be made by witnesses other than those who
attested the instrument.
In Barber v. Barber,8 9 the court declined to hold conditional a
will reciting that the testatrix was going on a journey and providing: "... . if anything should happen to me I request that everything I own both personal and real be given to my sister." The
court cited with approval Justice Holmes's decision in Eaton v.
Brown.4 o
The year has seen two interesting revocation cases. In one,
Fleming v. Fleming,41 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and perhaps even extended the doctrine of Casey v. Hogan,42 denying
partial revocation of a will by obliterating, tearing, or cutting
with intent to revoke such portion and held that such acts should
be disregarded and the will admitted to probate as originally ex4 s the Appellate Court
ecuted. In the other case, Gartin v. Gartin,
settled a question of greater difficulty in holding that the granting
of a decree of divorce to a wife with provision for alimony constitutes such a change of circumstances as to effect implied revocation of the husband's will leaving everything to the wife.
In the case of In re Judd's Estate, 4 the court held that the
amendment of 1927 to the Dower Act45 had accomplished its purpose-to obviate the doctrine of Clark v. Hanson4 6 -and that the
surviving spouse is entitled to take the statutory share of personalty notwithstanding the fact that there is no realty, and hence
technically no dower. 47
In Northern Trust Company v. Porter,4s the question was pre8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 148, § 2.
39 368 Ill. 215, 13 N.E. (2d) 257 (1938). Notes 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw 303; 27
Ill. B.J. 136.
40 193 U.S. 411, 24 S. Ct. 487, 48 L.Ed. 730 (1904).
41 367 Ill. 97, 10 N.E. (2d) 641 (1937). Notes, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 203; 26 Ill.
B. J. 214.
42 344 Ill. 208, 176 N.E. 257 (1931). Note, 10 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw 274.
43 296 Ill. App. 330, 16 N.E. (2d) 184 (1938). Notes, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
97; 52 Harv. L. Rev. 332.
44 292 Ill. App. 563, 11 N.E. (2d) 989 (1937). Notes, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 206;
26 Ill. B. J. 336.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 41, §§ 1, 10, 12; Laws 1927, p. 406, §§ 1, 2.
46 320 Ill. 480, 151 N.E. 369 (1926).
47 See Fox, "The Illinois Dower Act." 26 Ill. L. Rev. 145 (1931); Eagleton, "The
Illinois Dower Act as Applied to Estates Consisting of Personal Property," ibid., 164;
Stansell, "Defects in Illinois Probate Statutes," 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 111, 122
(1936).
48 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E. (2d) 487 (1938). Notes, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REvIEW 298; 36
Mich. L. Rev. 1411.
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sented for the first time: In determining whether exercise of a
general power of appointment by will violates the rule against
perpetuities, must the period of the rule be computed from the
time of creation of the power or from the time of exercise by the
donee? The court held that the period must be computed from
the creation of the power. It also ruled that damages for the
breach of a contract to exercise such a general testamentary
power in a particular manner are not recoverable, since to permit such recovery would be to defeat the intention of the donor
and convert the power, in effect, into one to appoint either by
deed or will.
MORTGAGES

Two cases involving foreclosure of mortgages have been decided, which, while in accord with well settled principles, are believed to be the first Illinois cases involving squarely the points
therein decided. In Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Chief
Wash Company,"9 a foreclosure suit was instituted by the successor trustee under a trust deed which provided that the trustee
"was not required to foreclose unless 25 per cent of the bondholders demanded such action." It appeared that 80 per cent of the
bondholders had consented to an extension, as the trustee well
knew, yet it persisted in the foreclosure proceeding. Upon petition to remove the successor trustee, the Supreme Court held
that its action was proper, inasmuch as it represented both the
depositing and nondepositing bondholders, and was required to
exercise sound discretion in protecting the rights of both groups.
In the second case, Notroma Corporation v. Miller,50 a foreclosure and sale had been had and a deficiency judgment had been
rendered against Miller, although he had not been personally
served, as he was a nonresident. Thereafter the unpaid balance
on the note was assigned to plaintiff, who brought attachment
proceedings. Miller defended on the ground that the note had
merged into the decree of foreclosure and deficiency, in response
to which defense the Appellate Court ruled that since the deficiency judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction, no merger had
taken place, and that the plaintiff might enforce payment of the
balance of the note in any legal fashion, including attachment.
49

368 Ill. 146, 13 N.E. (2d) 153 (1938). Note, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REviEw 289.

50 292 Ill. App. 612, 11 N.E. (2d) 630 (1937).
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TRUSTS

Perhaps the most important decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in the field of trusts during the past year was that of Love
v. Engelke.51 In that case a will devised unproductive real estate
with other property to trustees giving them discretionary powers
to sell it, the proceeds to be held for the purposes of the trust. The
income from the trust was payable to designated persons for life
and there were remainders to other persons. Years after the
death of the testatrix, the trustees sold the vacant real estate for
sums many times greater than its value at her death. The expenses of carrying the property had always been paid out of
gross income. Upon application by the life beneficiaries for a
share in the proceeds the court held that the entire amount belonged to the corpus of the estate and that the carrying charges
were properly paid out of income. The court apparently placed
its decision upon the ground that since the power to sell was discretionary in the absolute sense, the life beneficiaries had no
right to share in the proceeds. In this way the court distinguished
the decision in Edwards v. Edwards,52 which is probably the best
known case directing an apportionment under circumstances
like these. The court also refused to allow the expenses of carrying the property to be charged against the proceeds. This ruling
would have been entirely proper had the court allowed an apportionment. But in view of the decision upon the first point discussed, the result appears to be that the life beneficiaries have
borne the cost of the retention of property which was entirely for
the benefit of the remaindermen. The effect of this case should
be to require the draftsmen of trusts to take care to provide for
situations like the present one, especially if the trust is to be
administered in Illinois.
Two other cases dealing with trusts should be mentioned in this
survey. In Booth v. Krug," the settlor directed his trustees to invest the trust property and pay the income to the settlor's sister
"for her upkeep, maintenance and enjoyment" for life. Thereafter the income was to be paid in equal portions to the settlor's
two half-sisters. The will contained provisions authorizing the
trustees to use any or all of the corpus of the estate in the event
the income was insufficient "to meet the needs" of his sister or
51 368 ll. 342, 14 N.E. (2d) 228 (1938). Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 129.
53 368 IMI.487, 14, N.E. (2d) 645 (1938).
52 183 Mass. 581, 67 N.E. 658 (1903).
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half-sisters. After the death of the half-sisters the trustees were
directed to pay the residue of the estate to a Board of Education
for educational purposes. It was argued that since the trustees
had discretion to devote all of the trust property to private purposes, the bequest to charity was void for uncertainty. The
Supreme Court upheld the trust.
It is well established that where trustees are given absolute
discretion to devote all or any part of the trust property to private or charitable purposes as they see fit, the charitable trust
is void for uncertainty as to the trust res.5 4 In the instant case,
however, Mr. Chief Justice Farthing in a well-reasoned opinion
held that the direction of the trustees was not absolute and unlimited. It was pointed out that the possible exhaustion of the
trust res through its application to prior demands does not render
it uncertain. It is only where the application of property to the
purposes of the trust depends upon the absolute uncontrolled discretion of the person having possession of it that fatal uncertainty
exists. Under the terms of this trust the trustees could use the
principal for the benefit of the sister or half-sisters only in case
the income was inadequate for their needs. It was held that a
court of equity could supervise the acts of the trustees in this regard. Thus, there was no uncertainty as to the trust res available for the charitable purposes set forth in the will.
An unusual factual situation and an unusual problem was presented to the Appellate Court in the case of Haw v. Haw.55 The
settlor conveyed property to a trustee to pay the net income
therefrom to the settlor for life and upon the death of the settlor
to divide the corpus equally among the settlor's surviving children. The settlor and life beneficiary persuaded the trustee to
pay to her from time to time sums in excess of the income,
pleading necessity. These sums were expended in part at least
for the support of the life beneficiary and her children. The question arose as to whether the trustee should be allowed credit for
such sums in his account. The Appellate Court held that, although the children were minors and could not consent to such
application of the trust funds, it would be inequitable to hold the
trustee accountable under the circumstances. The decision appears to rest upon the special circumstances of the case rather
54 Spaulding v. Lackey, 340 II. 572, 173 N.E. 110 (1930).
55 295 Ill. App. 488, 15 N.E. (2d) 45 (1938). Note, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REvvFw 408.
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than upon any application of principles of estoppel. The general
question of whether a court of equity will approve a deviation
from instructions by a trustee where it would have authorized
such deviation if applied to at the time is not discussed. Whether
there was a power of revocation does not appear.
MISCELLANEOUS

In Foote v. City of Chicago,5" the Supreme Court held that a cotenant's acquisition of the entire premises through foreclosure
is sufficient notice of adverse claim and is sufficiently hostile to
start the running of the statute of limitations, and renders it unnecessary that a prescriptive claimant give actual notice that he
is holding adversely to his former cotenant.
The Supreme Court has seemingly retreated from the rather
extreme position taken in the Wells-Jackson case,5" in the White
Way Sign Company v. Chicago Title and Trust Company. 8 The
action was in replevin to recover from the owner of the freehold
a theater sign sold on conditional sales contract to a lessee who
was under a lease requiring the improvement in question to be
made, and provided that it should belong to the freehold. The
court denied recovery and held against the conditional vendor,
indicating that any change in the law of secret liens effected by
the Uniform Sales Act59 applied only to personalty and not to realty, and that there was no reason to apply it to fixtures. It reiterated the public policy of the state to protect the stability of
titles to real estate against unrecorded claims of third persons.
The court sought to distinguish the Wells-Jackson case on the
ground that in that case the sprinkler system (bolted into the
freehold) could be removed without substantial injury to the
freehold, whereas in the instant case it could not-a questionable
distinction in view 'of the facts.
CONTRACTS
SALES

In addition to the White Way Sign case, above discussed, the
Appellate Court handed down several interesting decisions deal50 368 I. 307, 13 N.E. (2d) 965 (1938).
57

Bank of Republic v. Wells-Jackson Corp., 358 m. 356, 193 N.E. 215 (1934). Note,

13 CHICAGO-KEN REviEw 172.
482, 14 N.E. (2d) 839 (1938). Note, 27 Ill. B. J. 134.
58 368 IMI.
59 Ill. Rev. Stat., 1937, Ch. 121 , § 23.
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ing with conditional sales. In Meisel Tire Company v. Edwards
0 the court held
Finance Corporation,"
that the vendor of automobile accessories, such as tires, tubes, and storage batteries sold
under a conditional sales contract and attached by the vendee to
an automobile which had also been purchased under a conditional sales contract with another vendor, could be repossessed for
default in payments, since such detachable accessories did not
become merged into, and an integral part of, the automobile.
This settles, seemingly for the first time, a troublesome question
of frequent occurrence. Another case was that of Ford Motor
Company v. National Bond and Investment Company," in which
an automobile manufacturer who delivered automobiles to a
dealer under a sales agreement, which recited that the cars were
purchased for resale, that any check should not constitute payment, and that title should remain in the manufacturer until the
cars were actually paid for by the dealer, was held entitled to recover in a suit for conversion against a finance company which
financed the purchases on a trust receipt transaction and took
possession of the cars upon the dealer's default, where the dealer's check to the manufacturer was dishonored by insufficient
funds. The court described the agreement as a conditional sale,
and construed it as permitting "resale" only after payment to
the manufacturer.
What seems to be the first treatment in Illinois of a "sale by
sample," is contained in People v. West Picture Frame Company.2 The court there held that where a lot of furniture which
is the subject matter of a sale is in existence and presently available for inspection, but only part of the lot is examined by the
buyer, there is not a sale by sample unless the parties expressly
so agree.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIENTS

Two decisions of interest with respect to negotiable instruments have been handed down. In McKee v. Gaulrapp, the
64
Supreme Court has extended the rule of several earlier cases
so as to permit one maker of a judgment note containing the recital, "all makers to this note are principals," to prove by parol
60 295 Ill.
App. 243, 14 N.E. (2d) 870 (1938).
61 294 Ill.
App. 585, 14 N.E. (2d) 306 (1938).
62 368 ]11.
336, 13 N.E. (2d) 958 (1938).
63 367 II. 321, 11 N.E. (2d) 380 (1937).
64 Ward v. Stout, 32 Ill. 399 (1863); Walker v. Chicago, Madison and Northern
R.R. Co., 277 Ill. 451, 115 N.E. 659 (1917); Bartel v. Zimmerman, 293 Ill. 154, 127 N.E.
373 (1920).
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evidence that he was, in fact, a surety, and after having paid
the judgment and taken an assignment, to enforce the judgment
against the other signer. In the other case, Houghton Mifflin
Company v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company,6" the Appellate Court has had occasion for the first time to
give effect to the amendment of 193166 of Section 9, subsection 3
of the negotiable instruments law,67 extending the principle of
the fictitious payee to the situation where the person named as
payee of a negotiable instrument was "not intended to have any
interest in it, and such fact was . .. known to" an "employee or
other agent who supplies the name of such payee."
INSURANCE

Two rather novel decisions concerning the construction of insurance contracts have been handed down, one in the state, and
the other in a Federal court. In Ginsburg v. PrudentialInsurance
Company,68 the Illinois Appellate Court construed the words
"permanent or total disability," used in a "rider" attached to a
life policy providing disability benefits, which policy entitled the
insurer to demand proof not oftener than once a year of insured's
continued disability, holding that insured was not required in the
first instance to prove that forever after he was to be totally and
permanently disabled. The court allowed recovery of disability
benefits upon the showing that for a time such disability was believed permanent, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of
trial the disability had ended. In the other case, Warbende v.
Prudential Insurance Company,69 the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the seventh circuit held that the characteristic scarlet blotches on the skin of the insured, caused by carbon monoxide poisoning from exhaust fumes of an automobile, satisfied the
requirement of an accidental death policy containing the customary language, "a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of
the body."
In a third case, People v. Acme Plate Glass Mutual Insurance
Company,0 the Appellate Court upheld the Insurance Director of
Illinois in the exercise of his statutory power and discretion. The
Director was engaged in the liquidation of the defendant com293 Ill. App. 423, 12 N.E. (2d) 714 (1938). Note, 27 MI1.B. J. 99.
67 Ill Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 98, § 29.
66 Laws 1931, p. 679.
69 97 F. (2d) 749 (1938).
68 294 li. App. 324, 13 N.E. (2d) 792 (1938).
70 292 Ill. App. 275, 10 N.E. (2d) 988 (1937). Note, 16 CHICAGO-KENr REVIEW 192.
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pany under a court order issued pursuant to the provisions of the
statute. 71 He had appointed a receiver, who qualified and proceeded with the litigation. Considerably more than thirty days
after the order of liquidation, the defendant company petitioned
the court to discharge the receiver and restore the defendant to
its property because it had meanwhile become solvent. The petition was allowed and the Appellate Court reversed the decree,
stating that the order of liquidation was final and that the court
had lost jurisdiction after thirty days except for purposes of enforcement. In the same order purporting to discharge the receiver, the chancellor had ordered the Director of Insurance to
issue a new license to the defendant. The court invalidated this
order also on the ground that the issuance of the license was vested in the discretion of the Director in the first instance, and could
not be compelled by the court until and unless the Director
abused his discretion in refusing to issue such license.
MISCELLANEOUS

In Chesnutt v. Schwartz, 72 the Appellate Court held that an
agreement by attorneys for a trustee in bankruptcy employing
accountants in the proceeding and promising to file and have allowed a claim for their services was not illegal by reason of the
failure of the attorneys to secure a court order of approval in accordance with the General Orders in Bankruptcy. s The court
allowed a recovery against the attorneys for breach of contract,
i.e., failure to cause the claim to be allowed.
In Tuzik v. Lukes, 74 the Appellate Court liberalized the rule allowing a reasonable restraint of trade, and extended it beyond
the situation where the restraint is ancillary to a sale of a business by the party excluded from competition. In the instant case
the covenantor had previously sold a bakery business, including
the property in which it was conducted. Several years later he
sold an adjoining piece of vacant property to the vendee of the
business, to which sale the covenant not to compete was ancillary. The covenant was sustained.
Ill. Bar. Stat. 1935, Ch. 73, § 105 (4).
72 293 Ill. App. 414, 12 N.E. (2d) 912 (1938). Note, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REviEw 281.
78 No. XLV: "No auctioneer or accountant shall be employed by a receiver or a
trustee except upon an order of the court expressly fixing the amount of the compensation or the rate or measure thereof."
74 293 Ill. App. 297, 12 N.E. (2d) 233 (1938). Notes, 16 CHICAO-KEINT REVIEW
284; 27 IMI.B. J. 101.
71
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TORTS

Seemingly the Illinois Appellate Court has joined the general
trend of decisions toward increasing the tort liability of municipalities. In Costello v. City of Aurora," the court held the city
liable to a minor, who injured his hand by reason of a cannon
ball falling on it from a pyramid constructed of concrete into
which this cannon ball, together with others, was imbedded, the
pyramid being maintained by the city in a public park and playground. Heretofore, Illinois, along with the majority of other
states, has regarded the maintenance of public parks as a governmental rather than a proprietary function. 7 Another decision increasing substantially the tort liability of municipalities
is that of Strappelli v. City of Chicago,77 involving a suit to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of a fall on the icy pavement of a safety island. The court, emphasizing the generality of the icy condition, held the city liable.
It appeared that the city had sufficient notice of the condition and
that the ice had been permitted to accumulate in uneven ridges.
Heretofore the duty of a city to keep its streets and sidewalks in
a reasonably safe condition has not been construed to require it
to prevent mere slipperiness due to natural accumulations of
ice and snow.78
Among the tort cases for the year are a few others in the
Appellate Court which may be worthy of mention, if only for the
interest of the factual problems presented. In Campion v. Chicago Landscape Company,7 9 the owner of a golf course was held
not liable to one struck by a poorly played ball from an adjoining
fairway, even though the course may have been laid out negligently, since such negligence would constitute at most the conditioning and not the efficient cause of the injury. Further, the
court declined to limit the doctrine of assumption of the risk to
the situation of master and servant, or other contractual relationship. In Crowley v. Bugg,8 0 on the other hand, the court held a
theater owner liable to a patron who tripped and fell over a child
75 295 Ill. App. 510, 15 N.E. (2d) 38 (1938).
76

Stein v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 247 Ill. App. 479 (1928); Gebhart v. Village

of La Grange Park, 354 Il. 234, 188 N.E. 372 (1933).
77

295 Ill. App. 469, 14 N.E. (2d) 986 (1938).

78

Grahagn v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911 (1931); Mareck v. City of

Chicago, 89 Ill. App. 358 (1889).
App. 225, 14 N.E. (2d) 879 (1938).
79 295 IMI.
80 292 Ill. App. 210, 10 N.E. (2d) 678 (1937).
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sitting in the aisle, on the ground that the child was not a sufficient intervening agency to constitute a superseding cause. Another owner and patron case where liability was sustained wasPabst v. Hillman's,"l in which the fall was caused by a stringbean
rather than a child. Here the court seemingly relieved the plaintiff of the burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence and distinguished the Kroger case82 on the ground that
here the defendant knew of the existence and location of the bean
in the aisle, since its employee had filled a hamper to such an
extent that the beans were falling out of it. It is believed that
this decision contains the first judicial definition of the term
"string bean."
Another Appellate Court case of considerable interest is that
of Wolever v. Curtiss Candy Company,8 where the court held
that the plaintiff had proved a prima facie case in establishing
that her husband was killed while performing his duties as an
employee of defendant company operating under workmen's
compensation; that the company, its insurer, and others had concealed the fact that he was killed in an accident and represented
that he had died from heart failure; that subsequently, in order
to recover workmen's compensation, she was put to expense in
having her husband's body disinterred, in having a post mortem
performed, and in having the body reinterred; and that she had
suffered extreme and aggravated mental anguish, etc. The trial
court had directed a verdict for defendants at the conclusion of
the plaintiff's case.
84

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Several interesting cases of first impression have been decided
in the field of criminal law and procedure. In People v. Menagas 5 the court held, for the first time in Illinois, that electric current or energy is property within the meaning of the larceny
statute. 6 In People v. Allen,"' the court solved a more difficult
problem than either of these-whether or not a person who has
81 293 Ill. App. 547, 13 N.E. (2d) 77 (1938).
82 Jones v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 273 Ill. App. 183 (1933).
83 293 Ill. App. 586, 13 N.E. (2d) 197 (1938).
84 Two statutory innovations, at least quasi criminal in character, are the provisions for the licensing of drivers of motor vehicles, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1938 supp., Ch. 95%,
§ 32b-36h, S.B. No. 14, § 1; and for the commitment of "Criminal sexual psychopathic persons," Ch. 38, §§ 820-825, H.B. No. 36, §H1-6.
85 367 Ill. 330, 11 N.E. (2d) 403, 113 A.L.R. 1276 (1937).
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 38, 1 387.
87 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E. (2d) 397 (1938). Note, 16 CHICAGo-KF.NT Rzvxiw 386.
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been tried for the death of one of two persons killed by the defendant in the same automobile accident will be subjected to
double jeopardy if subsequently tried for the death of the other.
The court answered the question in the negative, holding that the
killing of the two persons constituted two separate crimes.
In People v. Tobin,88 the court assimilated the doctrine of the
necessity of a motion for a new trial as a condition of appeal in
criminal cases to the practice prevailing in civil suits. In that
case the trial was had before the court without a jury, and the
court held that such motion was not necessary, but would have
been necessary had the case been tried before a jury.
In People v. Mack,89 the court has again had occasion to consider the effect of violations of the statute in the mode of selecting grand jurors. Eight of the jurors had been "selected by the
sheriff of Cook County from the body of the county," rather than
being drawn by lot from the jury commissioners' list as provided
by statute.' The court ordered the indictment quashed, and distinguished the Lieber case 9 ' on the ground that in that case there
had been substantial compliance and certainly an attempt to
comply with the law, whereas in the instant case there was
neither.
REMEDIES
EQUITY

The relation between law and equity and the present application of some old formulations of equitable principles were before
the Illinois courts in three recent cases. The results appear to
contribute somewhat to an understanding of the administration
of equity in Illinois since the passage of the Civil Practice Act.2
In the case of Darst v. Lang,8 the Supreme Court held that a
warranty deed might be reformed by inserting in it a provision
reserving a life estate to the grantors where there had been an
agreement by the grantee not to record the deed until the grantors were through with the property. Although the mistake was
one of law, it was said that relief was not barred, since the
88 369 Ill. 73, 15 N.E. (2d) 687 (1938).
89 367 Il. 481, 11 N.E. (2d) 965 (1937).
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 78, § 32.
91 People v. Lieber, 357 Ill. 423, 192 N.E. 331 (1934).
92 The question of the extent to Which the Civil Practice Act has accomplished a
merger of law and equity is far from clear under the provisions of that act. See for
example the comment on the effect of the Act in Scott and Simpson, Cases and Other
Materials on Judicial Remedies, p. 1i58 (1938).
98 367 Ill. 119, 10 N.E. (2d) 659 (1937). A practice question involved in this case
is discussed in 16 CmcAGo-KET REvsEw 164.
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mistake was as to the legal interests of the parties rather than
as to "a general rule of law prescribing conduct." This distinction was recognized in the case of Peter v. Peter,94 from which
the court quoted with approval. By employing this technique
the court gives evidence of a tendency to restrict the application
of the mistake of law dogma to situations where no great hardship will result. Courts have reached the same result by treating such mistakes as mistakes of fact.95
Evidence that the distinction between law and equity retains
most of its ancient vitality can be gathered from the language of
the Appellate Court in Printers Corporation v. Hamilton Investment Company.9 6 In this case the plaintiff corporations borrowed
money from the defendant, each giving its secured note for an
amount larger than that borrowed, payable in installments. The
notes contained clauses providing for confession of judgment
"at any time hereafter." It appears that installments on both
notes were regularly paid when due. Notwithstanding this fact
the defendant demanded the balance due on the notes in advance
of the maturity of the remaining installments and caused judgments to be confessed for the face of the notes less the amount
343 Ill. 493, 175 N.E. 846, 75 A.L.R. 890 (1931).
See note "Some Aspects of the Law of Mistake in Illinois," 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
446, 452. See also discussion of mistake of law in Restatement of Restitution, p. 179
et seq. and p. 35 et seq., Reporters' Notes.
Close scrutiny of the facts in Darst v. Lang raises a doubt as to whether there was
in reality any mistake. The defendant was a daughter of the grantors and lived with
them. The deed in question was made in 1926 and was intended to convey the
premises to the daughter as a gift. The defendant agreed orally at the time of the
execution of the deed that she would not record it, yet filed it for record less than
a year later. Apparently, no disagreement arose at that time. Several years after
the premises described in the deed had ceased to be occupied by the grantors and
the grantee, the grantee asserted a right to the rents.
Ordinarily, mistake means a state of mind not in accord with the facts. In this
sense, facts include rules of law. (Restatement of Restitution, sec. 6, comment a.)
In cases like Darst v. Lang it would seem that the parties frequently entertain no
erroneous belief whatever as to facts. The difficulty often arises from a belief that
another will not act unconscionably in the future. A parent who conveys his home
to his child by deed absolute is often under no delusion that his deed does not
convey title nor that the child might not legally assert rights against him. But
confidence reposed simply leads to the assumption that this will not be done. Relief
should be granted in such cases wherever necessary to prevent unjust enrichment
and violation of trust and confidence. Usually the cases employ either the mistake
technique or that of fraud arising from abuse of a confidential relationship. The
unjust enrichment element frequently remains inarticulate. Although the court in
the present case gave no independent recognition to this element, it did quote with
approval language from Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 93 N.E. 805 (1911), to the
effect that mistake of law or fact which results in unjust enrichment should be
relieved against
96 295 Ill. App. 34, 14 N.E. (2d) 517 (1938).
94
95
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actually paid. The plaintiffs filed motions and petitions to vacate
the judgments which were denied. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed
suits to enjoin the defendants from collecting that part of each
judgment which was in excess of the money borrowed. The defendant contended that the remedy at law by motions to vacate
the judgments was adequate and that the contract between the
parties was controlling.
The court upheld the action of the trial court in granting injunctive relief. Section 44 of the Civil Practice Act97 was said
not to have abolished the distinction between law and equity. In
answer to the defendant's contention that the remedy at law was
full, adequate, and complete and that the plaintiffs should have
appealed from the decision of the court denying their motions to
vacate the judgments the court said: "While it is true that in mo
tions to vacate judgments entered by confession it is said that
courts exercise equitable powers, yet we think it cannot be said
that in such case the court exercises as broad equity powers as
does a chancellor in a suit in equity."
Equity's supervision of the field of unfair competition resulted
in a holding by the Illinois Appellate Court that violations of
the criminal law may be restrained as unfair to a competitor who
cannot "fight fire with fire" without himself becoming a violator
of the law. In Jones v. Smith Oil and Refining Company,98 the
defendant was restrained at the suit of a competitor from using
an advertising scheme which amounted to a lottery. The defendant operated a chain of filling stations, one of which was located
across the street from the station operated by the plaintiff. The
scheme, known as the "Lucky License Pay-off Plan," involved
the issuance of cards to persons visiting defendant's stations entitling the holders to participate in a drawing for cash prizes at
the end of each month. The court cited with approval the wellknown decision of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Association,99 and properly
held that the injunction was not granted on the theory that it was
to restrain the defendant from committing a crime, but to prevent serious interference with the business of the plaintiff. It is
worth noting, however, that in this case and the Featherstone
case the conduct of the defendant constituted an unfair competitive method only because it was in violation of the law; otherIll. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 168.
98 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N.E. (2d) 42 (1938).
99 10 S.W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
97
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wise the plaintiff might have resorted to the same type of activity
to protect himself.
EVIDENCE

The year has seen at least two significant cases dealing with
the propriety of acquainting the jury in personal injury cases
with whether or not the defendant is insured. In Smithers v.
Henriquez,1°° the Supreme Court approved with certain limita-

tions the interrogation of veniremen on voir dire with respect to
their interest in any insurance company. In Smith v. Raup,10 '
the Appellate Court, while conceding the impropriety of showing
that the defendant is insured, sustained the right of defendant
to show that he was not insured. This fact was placed before the
jury by permitting the defendant to testify to the reply given by
him prior to suit to an inquiry made by the plaintiff relative to
insurance. The court took cognizance of the fact "that the belief
is prevalent and widespread" that in such cases "the defendant
is really the nominal party in interest," and felt that defendant
should have a right to rebut the inference.
In Sharp v. Bradshaw,1°2 a proceeding to impose a constructive
trust upon the property of a devisee by reason of an oral contract
made by the testator, the Supreme Court held that "where an
asserted oral contract is out of harmony and inconsistent with a
will made by the promisor subsequent to the time when it is alleged that he entered into the contract in question, the will is entitled to be taken into consideration as bearing upon the improbability of the contract having been made as alleged."
The case of People v. Black'0 involves an interesting question
of expert testimony, that is, whether or not a medical expert
should be permitted to express an opinion with respect to the sanity of the defendant where such opinion was not based upon a
hypothetical question, but (in addition to personal observation)
"was formed, in part, upon the report of the social investigation
made of the defendant, the psychiatric and medical examinations
and psychological tests, all made by others than the witness."
The majority of the court held the opinion inadmissible as invading the province of the jury. Mr. Justice Wilson dissented without opinion, and Mr. Justice Orr (concurring specially on other
grounds) differed with the majority, saying: "The opinion of an
100 368 I. 588, 15 N.E. (2d) 499 (1938). Notes, 16 CHICAGo-KENT REVIEw 371; 52
Harv. L. Rev. 166.
App. 171, 15 N.E. (2d) 936 (1938).
101 296 Ill.
209, 10 N.E. (2d) 801 (1937).
103 367 Ill.
102 367 Ill. 526, 12 N.E. (2d) 1 (1937).
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expert in insanity cases is peculiar and different from other expert testimony."
In Wuebbles v. Shea and Lamar,1 04 the Appellate Court had occasion to pass upon an entirely new situation involving the "dead
man's rule." 1°5 Two defendants were sued as joint tortfeasors for
the wrongful death of the plaintiff's intestate. At the close of the
plaintiff's case, Lamar moved for a directed verdict, but the motion was denied. Thereafter, the defendant Shea called Lamar
as a witness, but the trial court ruled him incompetent as an interested party. The Appellate Court held that the motion of Lamar for a directed verdict should have been allowed and hence,
that "he was incompetent only because of an erroneous ruling
of the trial court." The court reversed as to Lamar, and reversed
and remanded as to defendant Shea.
In Scally v. Flannery,1 6 a wrongful death action in which plaintiff proved freedom of decedent from contributory negligence by
evidence of his careful habits, the Appellate Court held that the
defendant could not offer himself as an eyewitness and thereby
obtain the benefit of the rule prohibiting evidence of habits of
17
care on the part of the deceased where there is an eyewitness.
CIVIL PRACTICE1 0 s

Municipal Court of Chicago
Three significant decisions have been handed down dealing
with the powers of the Municipal Court of Chicago. In the first
of these, Danoff v. Larson,1 9 the Supreme Court had occasion to
pass upon the rule making power of the Municipal Court. Because a bailiff was unable to serve a defendant in the usual fashion, the trial court directed that service be had by leaving a copy
of the summons at his place of business and also mailing a copy
294 IMI. App. 157, 13 N.E. (2d) 646 (1938).
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1937, Ch. 51, § 2: "No party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, or person directly interested in the event thereof, shall be allowed to testify
therein of his own motion, or in his own behalf, by virtue of the foregoing section,
when any adverse party sues or defends as the... administrator ... of any deceased
person .. . unless . . ."
106 292 Ill. App. 349, 11 N.E. (2d) 123 (1937). Notes, 16 CHICAGO-KET RSviEw 71;
5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 502.
107 See Young v. Patrick, 323 Ill. 200, 153 N.E. 623 (1926).
108 The Supreme Court at both the October, 1937, and April, 1938, terms adopted
extensive changes in the rules relating to civil procedure in both trial and appellate
courts. Convenient summaries of these changes have been prepared and published
under the auspices of the Chicago Bar Association. See pamphlets dated December 1,
1937, and July 11, 1938, prepared by Albert E. Jenner, Jr.
109 368 III. 519, 15 N.E. (2d) 290 (1938). Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 120.
104

105
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to such place of business. This order was entered on the authority of Rule 10A of the Municipal Court. The defendant contended
that the service was bad and that the rule was invalid, but
that if the rule was within the act" granting power to the Municipal Court. to make rules, such act was unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court sustained the act of the legislature and the rulemaking power of the Municipal Court, but held that the act conferred no power to make this rule, nor any with respect to service of summons, because (1) such power would involve substantive questions of law and jurisdiction; (2) the making of such
rule was not within the term "practice" over which the court had
been given power to make rules; and (3) the particular rule here
involved was not made by the court but only by a single judge.
In the second decision, Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Stanford,"' the Appellate Court held that the amendment of 1931112
to Section 2 of the Municipal Court Act had enlarged the scope
of the court's jurisdiction to include actions on foreign judgments, since they were "contracts ... implied in law." Formerly the court was held to be without jurisdiction of such actions.'
In the third case, Huber v. Van Schaack-Mutual, Inc.,' 4 the
Supreme Court sustained Rule 167 of the Municipal Court,
which provides in substance that where the plaintiff asks and
pays for a six-man jury, the defendant must pay for the other
six jurors if he desired a jury of twelve. The defendant had contended that the requirement that he pay for the additional jurors
deprived him of his constitutional right to a common law jury.
Substituted Service on Nonresident Motorists
The provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act" 5 for substituted service on nonresident motorists, by serving the Secretary of State,
have been twice construed during the year on points arising in
110 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 37, § 375. 111 296 Ill. App. 1, 15 N.E. (2d) 616 (1938).
112 IlM.Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 37, § 357; Laws 1931, p. 420.
118 Brown v. Gerson, 182 Ill. App. 177 (1913); People v. Dummer, 274 IM. 637
113 N.E. 934 (1916).
114 368 Ill.
142, 13 N.E. (2d) 179 (1938).

115 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 95 , § 23: "The use and operation by a nonresident of
a motor vehicle over the highways of the State of Illinois, shall be deemed an
appointment by such nonresident of the Secretary of State, to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process in any action or proceeding
against him, growing out of such use or resulting in damage or loss to person or
property, and said use or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that
any such process against him which is so served, shall be of the same legal force and
validity as though served upon him personally."
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16 the automobile of
Illinois for the first time. In Jones v. Pebler"
the defendants, operated by their servant, was involved in a collision. Service on the defendants was had, in accordance with
the statute, on the Secretary of State. The defendants moved to
quash the service on the ground that they were not "operating"
the vehicle, but that it was being operated by their servant. The
Appellate Court sustained this contention, holding that, to permit
substituted service, the defendant must personally operate the
car. In the other case, Nelson v. Richardson,11 7 the court held
that in view of the provision for substituted service on a nonresident, the absence of such nonresident from the state would not
toll the statute of limitations," 8 such special provision constituting an exception by implication to the statute of limitations.

Appeals
Four Supreme Court cases involving appeals are worthy of
mention. In People v. Kennedy," 9 a mandamus proceeding to
compel a county superintendent of schools to annex certain territory to a high school district, the court was called upon to decide whether or not an owner of property in the territory sought
to be annexed, who was not a party to the mandamus proceeding,
could appeal. The court held that he might appeal, indicating
that although prior to the Civil Practice Act the exclusive method
of review available to such a person would have been a writ of
error, Section 81 of the act 120 allows such appeal to any party who
would be affected by the judgment or decree irrespective of
whether or not he was a party below.
The second case, that of Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. McClary,1 1 simply gives effect to the amendment of July 2, 1937, to Section 7512 changing the time within
which appeals may be taken from the Appellate Court. In the
third case, Gyure v. Sloan Valve Company,'23 the court held that
while assignment of errors in a brief is no longer jurisdictional,
116 296 Ill. App. 460 N.E. (2d) 438 (1938). Notes, 17 CmCAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 73;
App. 504, 15 N.E. (2d) 17 (1938).
117 295 Ill.
6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 122.
118 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 83, § 19: " . . if, after the cause of action accrues
[against a person], he departs from and resides out of the state, the time of his
absence is no part of the time limited for the commencement of the action."
119 367 Ill. 236, 10 N.E. (2d) 806 (1937).
120 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 205: "The right heretofore possessed by any
person not a party to the record to review a judgment or decree by writ of error
shall be preserved by notice of appeal."
414, 11 N.E. (2d) 924 (1937). Note, 16 CHICAGo-KENT REVIEW 163.
121 367 Ill.
122 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 199; Laws 1937, p. 994.
489, 11 N.E. (2d) 963 (1937).
123 367 Ill.
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as it was under the former practice, 2 4 yet failure to comply with

the rules of the court, here specifically Rule

39,125

requiring the

brief to show the errors relied upon for reversal, will justify dismissing the appeal. In the last of the cases, Bank of Republic v.
Kaspar State Bank,12 6 the court held that the omission of the
prayer for relief required by Rule 33121 is not jurisdictional but
merely a matter of form, the omission of which will not be regarded as fatal.
Two Appellate Court cases dealing with appeals are perhaps
worthy of inclusion in this survey. In Gholston v. Terrell, 12 the
court held that the filing of the appellee's brief subsequent to his
motion to dismiss the appeal for failure of the appellant to file a
bond within the time prescribed, did not operate as a joinder in
appeal and waiver of the motion to dismiss. Gillis v. Jurzyna129
was distinguished on the ground that in the instant case the brief
indicated clearly that the appellee had no intention of waiving
the motion to dismiss.
In the other Appellate Court case, that of People v. Village of
Wilmette,' the court was confronted with the problem of whether notice of appeal was required to be served on all parties or
only on those who would be affected by the appeal. The court
held that Rule 34131 of the Supreme Court should not be construed
to require service of notice on parties who defaulted in the trial
court. There has been a conflict in several of the appellate courts
with respect to this point,'132 but the conflict has now been reto bring it
solved by the Supreme Court amending its rule so 3as
3
into conformity with the rule of the present case.1
Civil Practice Act
In Kronan Building and Loan Association v. Medeck,134 the
Armour v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 353 IMI. 575, 187 N.E. 532 (1933).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.39.
126 369 Ill. 34, 15 N.E. (2d) 721, 116 A.L.R. 1464 (1938).
127 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.33.
128 292 I. App. 192, 10 N.E. (2d) 868 (1937).
129 284 Ill. App. 174, 1 N.E. (2d) 763 (1936).
180 294 Ill. App. 362, 13 N.E. (2d) 990 (1938). Note, 16 CHICAGO-KEwT Rzvtcw 273.
131 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.34.
132 See notes, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 52, 273.
133 "()
A copy of the notice by which the appeal is perfected shall be served
upon each party whether appellee or co-party who would be adversely affected by
any reversal or modification of the order, judgment or decree, and upon any other
person or officer entitled by law to a notice of appeal, within ten days after said
notice of appeal is filed in the lower court."
184 368 Ill. 118, 13 N.E. (2d) 66 (1938). Notes, 16 CHCcAGO-KENT REVIEw 279; 27
Ill. B.J. 131.
124
125
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Supreme Court construed Sections 38, 43, and 44 of the Civil Practice Act 185 as allowing the joinder of issues of title with those arising on a bill of foreclosure, and thereby changed the former rule
that issues of title were not germane to a foreclosure proceeding.136 This result would seem obviously correct, as would also
3 7 where it held that
that of the same court in Watt v. Cecil,"
failure to reply to an answer charging forgery in a foreclosure
suit constituted an admission of the truth of such answer. The
court was merely required to give literal effect to Sections 32 and
40 of the Civil Practice Act.'3 8 In passing it is to be noted that
in this case the court also approved a publication for "unknown
owners" made five months after the filing of an amended bill
for foreclosure as being within a reasonable time, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of such publication more than three
years had elapsed since the filing of the original bill. Another
case requiring merely such a literal interpretation of the Civil
Practice Act, here of Section 60,139 was that of Hadley v. White,4 0
holding that the former practice' has been changed by that section, which expressly provides that when an adverse party is
called as a witness, the one so calling him "shall not be concluded thereby but may rebut the testimony thus given.... " The suit
was one by an attorney to recover fees, and it was he who called
the adverse party as a witness.
142
In Metropolitan Trust Company v. Bowman Dairy Company,'
the court was called upon to construe a more difficult section of
the Act, Section 46,1"1 relating to amendments after the statute of
limitations has run. The Supreme Court took an even more liberal attitude than that of the Appellate Court in the Pevely Dairy
case, 144 holding:
Briefly summarized, Section 46 permits any amendment of a pleading,
filed in apt time, after the time limited for commencing suit to set up a
cause of action on any claim which was intended to be brought by the
185 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 162, 167 & 168.
186 Jones v. Horrom, 363 Ill. 193, 1 N.E. (2d) 694 (1936); Lithuanian Alliance v.

Home Bank, 362 Il. 439, 200 N.E. 167 (1936).
137 38 Ill. 510, 15 N.E. (2d) 292 (1938).
188 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 156 & 164.
Ibid., § 184.
140 367 IM. 406, 11 N.E. (2d) 813 (1937). Note, 16 CHICAaO-KlT RIEVW 169.
'39

141 Chance v. Kinsella, 310 Ill. 515, 142 N.E. 194 (1924).
142 369 Ill. 222, 15 N.E. (2d) 838 (1938). For note on the case in the Appellate
Court, 292 Ill. App. 492, 11 N.E. (2d) 847 (1937), see 26 Ill. B. J. 296.
143 IlL Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 170.
144 Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 278 IIl. App. 350 (1935). Note, 13
CmcAro-KNr

zvIxw 299.
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original pleading, provided, only, that it grew out of the same transaction
or occurrence, and it is not necessary that the original pleading technically
state a cause of action, or that a cause of action set out in the amendment be substantially the same as any cause of action stated in the original
pleading.
In the present case the action was for wrongful death against
Bowman Dairy Company and one Kunz. The company's vehicle
was a horse-drawn wagon; that of Kunz was a truck. It seems
that Kunz drove onto the sidewalk and struck decedent in avoiding a collision with the wagon. The original complaint alleged
that both vehicles struck decedent. The amended complaint
stated that the negligence of both defendants caused the truck
of Kunz to strike the decedent. The court affirmed a judgment
against Bowman Dairy Company entered on the amended complaint.
Three cases in the Appellate Court dealing with miscellaneous
practice questions should perhaps be mentioned briefly. In De
Ronchi v. Northern Trust Company,45 the court held that the requirement of Supreme Court Rule 8, that a motion to strike be
filed within twenty days,14 may be waived, by conduct, especially
in view of the provision contained in the rule allowing the judge
discretion to extend the time. 4 7 In Boltz v. Crawford and North
Avenues Theatre Company,4 8 the court held that a motion to strike
cannot reach an incorrect allegation of damages unless that
ground is specifically indicated in the motion. The analogy of
general and special demurrers is obvious. In Farmer v. Alton
Building and Loan Association,4 9 the court held that while Section 68 of the Civil Practice Act, 50° as supplemented by Supreme
Court Rule 22,151 "changes the rule under the former practice and
permits either party to file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ... its only function is to raise the question as to
whether the motion for a directed verdict should have been allowed," and not to test the sufficiency of the pleadings.
292 IMI. App. 136, 10 N.E. (2d) 975 (1937).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.8: "(4) Unless otherwise provided, a motion
attacking a pleading must be filed and served within 20 days after the last day
allowed for the filing of the pleading attacked."
147 Ibid.: "(5) The judge, for good cause shown on special motion after notice to
the opposite party, may extend the time for putting in any pleading on the doing of
any act which is required by the rules to be done, within a limited time, either
before or after the expiration of the time."
148 294 IlL App. 258, 13 N.E. (2d) 844 (1938).
149 294 Il. App. 206, 13 N.E. (2d) 652 (1938).
150 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 192 (3) a.
145
146
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MISCELLANEOUS

Burket v. Reliance Bank and Trust Company'52 deals with
compositions of stockholders' liability in closed banks, under
Section 11 of the banking act, 5 ' which provides in part:
Said receiver shall have authority upon the order of the court appointing him to employ such auditors and assistants as may be necessary to
establish and recover the liabilities of the stockholders, and may, with the
approval of the court enter into compositions with insolvent stockholders,
if any.

The Supreme Court held that such approval of the court may not
be given until the creditors have had a hearing on the question of
insolvency of the stockholders, resting the right to such hearing
upon "due process of law."
In Campagna v. Automatic Electric Company,1 4 the Appellate
Court held the defendant not liable in garnishment, notwithstanding the admission in its answer that it paid the debtor in
advance even after service for the purpose of defeating garnishment proceedings-an instance of unusual frankness in pleading.
In Sneeden v. The Industrial Commission,15 5 a case of first impression in Illinois, the receiver of a national bank was held to
be a proper respondent in a claim under the workmen's compensation act, made by an employee of the bank who was injured
while engaged in tearing down a store building owned by the
bank in receivership.
GOVERNMENT
TAXATION

In three significant cases the Supreme Court applied the Oc15 7
cupational Sales Tax Act. 156 In the first, Bardon v. Nudelman,'
a case in which it would seem the court had little choice, it rejected the contention of the retail liquor dealers that the act
would constitute double taxation as to them in view of the license
58
fees that they are required to pay under Liquor Control Act.
The court pointed out that the fees paid under that act were for
151 Ibid., § 259.22: "The power of the Court to enter judgment notwithstanding the
verdict may be exercised in all cases where, under the evidence in the case, it would
have been the duty of the Court to direct a verdict without submitting the case to
the jury."
152 367 Ill. 196, 11 N.E. (2d) 6 (1937).
153 III. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 16 , § 11.
154 293 Ill. App. 437, 12 N.E. (2d) 695 (1938).
155 366 Ill. 552, 10 N.E. (2d) 327, 113 A.L.R. 1447 (1937).
156 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, H 440-453.
158 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 43, §§ 94-195.
157 369 Ill. 214, 15 N.E. (2d) 836 (1938).
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purposes of regulation, rather than of revenue, as in the case
of the Sales Tax Act. In the second decision, that of Babcock v.
Nudelman,15 the court sustained the contention of optometrists
furnishing eyeglasses that the transfer of property by them was
''merely incidental to the services rendered," and held that they
were not subject to the tax. In the third case, Herlihy Mid-Continent Company v. Nudelman,16 0 the court overruled its previous
decision in Blome Company v. Ames,' 6' and held that building
contractors are not liable to pay sales tax except upon materials
which retain their identity, i.e., fixtures.
The Supreme Court wrote the logical sequel to the Domestic
Arts 6 2 and Orrington 6 3 cases in Ohio Street Hotel Corporationv.
Lindheimer,6 4 in holding that any amount paid on taxes in excess of the 75 per cent required by Section 162165 is money paid
voluntarily and cannot be recovered.
In People v. Jastromb,66 the court decided the controversy between the assessor and the Board of Tax Appeals with respect to
the power of the latter to revise assessments of real property in
other than quadrennial assessment years in favor of the existence of such power. Another decision in favor of the board was
that of People v. Board of Appeals,6 7 in which the court again
demonstrated the futility of attempting to mandamus taxing authorities to compel the assessment of omitted property-here,
capital stock tax of the Tribune Company for the years 1872 to
1934. The court said the averments were insufficient 68
In People v. Metropolitan Trust Company,'6 9 the Supreme
Court has now construed the Inheritance Tax Act 7° with respect
to powers of appointment for the first time since the repeal in
1933171 of the portion of subsection 4 of Section 1 dealing specificalNote, 32 Il. L. Rev. 685.
160 367 Ill. 600, 12 N.E. (2d) 638, 115 A.L.R. 485 (1937). Notes, 16 CHCAGo-KE=r
159 367 Ill. 626, 12 N.E. (2d) 635 (1937).

REVIEW 294; 32 IMIL. Rev. 685.
161 365 Ill. 456, 6 N.E. (2d) 841, 111 A.L.R. 940 (1937).
162 School of Domestic Arts & Science v. Harding, 331 Ill. 330, 163 N.E. 15 (1928).
163 People ex rel. Sweitzer v. The Orrington Co., 360 Ill. 289, 195 N.E. 642 (1935).
164 368 Il.294, 13 N.E. (2d) 970 (1938).
165 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, § 150: "If any person shall desire to object pursuant
to the provisions of section 191 of the Act, hereby amended, to all or any part of a
real property tax for any year, for any reason other than that the real estate is not
subject to taxation, he shall first pay at least 75 per cent of the tax."
166 367 Ill. 348, 11 N.E. (2d) 368 (1937).
167 367 Ill. 559, 12 N.E. (2d) 666 (1938).
168 Kent, "Tax Litigation in Illinois," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 698.
169 369 IIl. 84, 15 N.E. (2d) 729 (1938). Note, 16 CmcAGo-KENT RE IEw 404.
171 Laws 1933, p. 889.
170 IlL Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, 11 375 et seq.
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ly with nonexercise thereof, 172 and has held that a tax is presently
assessable in the estate of the donor of such power but only on the
assumption that the power will not be exercised and that the undisposed of remainder will go to the heirs-at-law, and that the tax
cannot be assessed in the donor's estate on the assumption that
the donee will exercise the power in favor of a stranger, inasmuch as the unrepealed portion of subsection 4 of Section 1, providing for assessment of the tax in the donee's estate in such
case, is still in force.173
The Appellate Court case of Harrisonv. Deutsch174 seems to be
the first case passing squarely upon the question of the priority
of a claim in the probate court by the collector of internal revenue for an income tax deficiency assessment, filed after the expiration of the one year period for the filing of claims. The court
held that such claim was entitled to priority as a class 2a claim.
In Brown v. Jacobs,'7 5 the Supreme Court of Illinois placed its
stamp of approval on a practical solution to the half-penalty tax
dilemma which has confronted Illinois. The amendment to Section 177 of the Revenue Act,'17 providing for the decreeing of half
penalties where taxes have been contested in good faith, is of
dubious constitutionality and remains untested. As a result the
remaining half of the interest, practically speaking, clouds the
title to land with respect to which the provision has been invoked.
In the instant case, an action ,for specific performance for the
sale of land brought by the vendor, the court held that the
172 -...
and whenever any person, or corporation possessing such a power of
appointment so derived shall omit or fail to exercise the same within the time
provided therefor, in whole or in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of
this Act shall be deemed to take place to the extent of such omission or failure,
in the same manner as though the persons or corporations thereby becoming
entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the property to which such power related
had succeeded thereto by a will of the donee of the power failing to exercise such
power, taking effect at the time of such omission or failure."
173 See People v. Cavenee, 368 Ill. 391, 14 N.E. (2d) 232 (1938); also Dicus,
"Taxation of Powers of Appointment under the Illinois Inheritance Tax Law," 14
CHICAGO-KENT REvmnw 14 (1935).
174 294 Ill. App. 8, 13 N.E. (2d) 511 (1938). Note, 16 CMCAGO-KENT REVIEw 391.
175 367 Ill. 545, 12 N.E. (2d) 1210 (1937).
176 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, § 165, Laws 1929, p. 635: "Provided, in the years
1929, 1930 and 1931, the court may, in entering judgment or decree in any action or
proceeding wherein the validity of any tax shall have been in good faith contested,
and the court shall so find by a finding to be entered of record, waive all or any
part of such interest otherwise accruing thereon, not to exceed fifty (50) per cent
of such interest, and may, in such judgment or decree, provide that not to exceed
fifty (50) per cent of such interest otherwise accruing on such tax so in good faith
contested, shall be waived during the pendency of any appeal or other proceeding
diligently prosecuted for the review or vacation of such judgment or decree."
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"cloud" had been removed by decrees of a court of chancery,
on suits instituted by the owner against the county treasurer
and ex-officio county collector, and the county clerk of Cook
County, and enjoining them from collecting 50 per cent of the
interest. The Supreme Court, without passing upon the constitutionality of Section 177, pointed out that the decrees did not purport specifically to rest upon that section, that they may have
been "entered in pursuance of the broad powers of a court of
equity," and that the decrees, even if erroneous, were not subject to collateral attack. The court said:
The court passed on questions based on the statute, and whether it
decided rightly or wrongly with respect to the validity of the taxes and
the remission of penalties, would not affect the jurisdiction to render a
judgment or decree. Assuming that it decided erroneously, its decree was
not void.

The significance of the decision has been fully appreciated by the
bar, and seized upon and made use of in a flood of suits instituted
since its rendition.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Government's power to regulate business provided the major
constitutional problems dealt with by the Illinois Supreme Court
during 1937 and 1938. The cases do not indicate any great change
in the course of constitutional development but several are
worthy of mention.
Reminiscent of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court
in Ribnik v. McBride177 is the recent decision in the case of People v. Redfield.7 8 In this case the court held unconstitutional the
provisions of the act of 1935 relating to employment agencies,
which forbade any licensed employment agent to require any
person for whom employment was obtained to sign a judgment
note or execute a wage assignment. 179 Violations were punishable by fine or imprisonment.1 0 Citing Ribnik v. McBride'8
and City of Spokane v. Macho,i1 2 the court said that there was
nothing inherently evil in the business of employment agencies.
Since judgment notes and wage assignments were in general use
by many different kinds of business establishments, employment
17 277 U.S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913 (1927).
178 366 Ill. 562, 10 N.E. (2d) 341 (1937). Notes, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 178; 26

Ill. B. J. 329.
179 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 48, § 197e.
180 Il. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 48, § 1971.
181 277 U.S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913 (1927).
182 51 Wash. 322, 98 P. 755 (1909).
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agencies could not be forbidden to use them unless there were
peculiar circumstances relating to the business of such agencies.
The court held the discrimination to be unreasonable. The opinion contains no discussion of the conditions which may have induced the legislature to pass the condemned provisions but
merely takes the view that they bear no reasonable relation to
the comfort, health, safety, or welfare of the people. The restrictions were declared to be violative18 3 of the due process clauses
of the state and Federal constitutions.
On the other hand, in Stearns v. Chicago,' a municipal ordinance imposing higher license fees on parking lots than on garages was upheld. The court pointed out that the business of
parking lots was such as to require greater police protection
against theft of cars and greater police regulation to prevent congestion of streets than that of garages. Thus, the classification
was declared to be reasonable.
In two other cases the court upheld regulations applicable to
businesses traditionally subject to unusual restrictions. In
O'Connor v. Rathje 85 the court said that the right to deal in intoxicating liquors was not an inherent right and was not protected against governmental action by the Fourteenth Amendment
unless such action did not have the protection of the community
as its real object. Section 14 of the Dram Shop Act'8 6 was attacked in this case but the court held that the constitutionality of
the Dram Shop Act had been previously settled so that. no substantial constitutional question was involved. In the other case,
City of Chicago v. R. & X. Restaurant,18 7 the court sustained the
power delegated to the city of Chicago to regulate the restaurant
business.
The troublesome question of the definiteness with which a
statute must describe a criminal offense was discussed in People v. Green.8 8 The court considered and upheld as constitutional
Section 48 of the Uniform Traffic Act. 8 ' The court referred
to decisions of the United States Supreme Court under the antitrust laws and disapproved some of the language in its own prior
183 III. Const. of 1870, Art. 2, § 2; Const. of U.S., 14th Amend., par. 1.
184 368 Ill. 112, 13 N.E. (2d) 63, 114 A.L.R. 1507 (1938).

186 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 43, § 135.
368 Ill. 83, 12 N.E. (2d) 878 (1938).
187 369 Ill. 65, 15 N.E. (2d) 725 (1938).
188 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E. (2d) 278 (1938). Note, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 484.
189 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 95 , § 145: "Any person who drives any vehicle with a
wilful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving."
185
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opinion in People v. Beak.190 The view of the court as to the definiteness required by "due process" was stated 9 ' in the following
language:
We think the true rule is that if the legislature uses words having a
common law meaning or a meaning made definite by statutory definition
or previous judicial construction, it may strike directly at the evil intended
to be curbed, leaving it to the pleader to state facts bringing the case within
the statutory definition and to the judicial department of government to
interpret the application of the act to the facts stated.

Mr. Justice Stone dissented from the court's conclusion that an
information merely following the words of the statute was insufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge against
him as required by Article 2, Section 9 of the Constitution of 1870.
The court had occasion to discuss the problem of separation of
powers as arising under the Old Age Assistance Act in the case
of Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare.'9 2 It was there
held that the provision of Section 10 of that act 1913 for a trial
de novo in the Circuit Court after a decision by the State Department upon the question of eligibility of an applicant for old age
assistance was invalid as an attempt to authorize a branch of the
judicial department to exercise functions of the executive department. The decision follows the interpretation of Article 3 of
the Constitution of 1870 indicated in Aurora v. Schoberlein.94
Mr. Justice Stone dissented, calling attention to the fact that
mandamus would lie in a proper case to compel the granting of
old age assistance under the act. He also expressed the opinion
that since the legislature would not have enacted the act without
providing an opportunity for appeal to the courts, the invalidity
of the provision of Section 10 rendered the entire act invalid.
Mr. Justice Stone's view that mandamus will lie in a proper
case to compel the granting of old age assistance was accepted
by the court in People v. Department of Public Welfare.195 The
court was of the opinion, however, that the function of determining whether the executive department had acted arbitrarily was
a judicial question. The opinion in this case was filed five days
after that in the Borreson case discussed above. It was pointed
out that while some of the provisions of the act involve the exercise of administrative discretion others are specific in their requirements. Apparently the court was of the opinion in both of
190 291 M11.
449, 126 N.E. 201 (1920).
192 368 Ill. 425, 14 N.E. (2d) 485 (1938).
194 230 IlM 496, 82 N.E. 860 (1907).

191 p. 250.
193 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 23, § 419.
195 368 M. 503, 14 N.E. (2d) 642 (1938).
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these cases that the trial de novo allowed by Section 10 required
the Circuit Court to exercise administrative discretion. In People v. Department of Public Welfare, it was held that one who
is an inmate of a private institution is not thereby ineligible to
receive old age assistance from the state since there is no provision to this effect in the act.
Three cases dealing with other phases of constitutional law
should receive brief mention. In Martin v. Strubel,91 the present
statute empowering courts of equity to render deficiency decrees
in foreclosure suits where there has been personal service of
process 9 7 was held not to interfere with the right to trial by jury.
98
Of lesser importance were the decisions in People v. Palmer'
9
and Gillespie v. Barrett. " In the former case, Section 3 of the
Insurance Act of 1879 (now repealed) requiring the Director of
Insurance to revoke the license of any foreign insurance corporation which removed or attempted to remove any case to the
Federal courts, was declared unconstitutional, following Terral
v. Burke Construction Company.0 0 In this case the court expressly overruled People v. Pavey201 and noted that Sections 109
and 111 of the new insurance code 20 2 do not contain provisions
analagous to those condemned.
In the Gillespie case the court held that legislators could be
members of legislative commissions without violating the provisions of Article 3, or of Article 4, Section 15 of the Constitution
of 1870 where the acts creating the commissions provided that
the members should receive no compensation.
196 367 Inl. 21, 10 N.E. (2d) 325 (1937).
197 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 95, § 17.
198 367 Ill. 513, 11 N.E. (2d) 931 (1937).
199 368 Il1. 612, 15 N.E. (2d) 513 (1938).
200 257 U.S. 529, 42 S. Ct. 188, 66 L. Ed. 352 (1921).
201 151 Ill. 101, 37 N.E. 691 (1894).
202 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 73, H§ 722, 723. See also § 731.

